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While much has been written about the consequences of zero-sum (or fixed-pie) beliefs,
their measurement has received almost no systematic attention. No researchers, to our
awareness, have examined the question of whether the endorsement of a zero-sum-like
proposition depends on how the proposition is formed. This paper focuses on this issue,
which may also apply to the measurement of other attitudes. Zero-sum statements
have a form such as “The more of resource X for consumer A, the less of resource
Y for consumer B.” X and Y may be the same resource (such as time), but they can
be different (e.g., “The more people commute by bicycle, the less revenue for the city
from car parking payments”). These statements have four permutations, and a strict
zero-sum believer should regard these four statements as equally valid and therefore
should endorse them equally. We find, however, that three asymmetric patterns routinely
occur in people’s endorsement levels, i.e., clear framing effects, whereby endorsement
of one permutation substantially differs from endorsement of another. The patterns seem
to arise from beliefs about asymmetric resource flows and power relations between rival
consumers. We report three studies, with adult samples representative of populations in
two Western and two non-Western cultures, demonstrating that most of the asymmetric
belief patterns are consistent across these samples. We conclude with a discussion of
the implications of this kind of “order-effect” for attitude measurement.
Keywords: attitudes, beliefs, zero-sum, measurement, attitude bias
“There’s nothing surer, the rich get richer and the poor get—children”
Raymond B. Egan and Gus Kahn, “Ain’t We Got Fun.”
ASYMMETRIES IN ZERO-SUM BELIEFS
A zero-sum belief is one in which the total amount of available resources is considered to be fixed,
and gains to one party are matched by others’ losses. Some resources are genuinely zero-sum. As
any child knows, if a larger piece of Mother’s freshly baked cake is given to a sibling, then less is
available for him or her. Other resources, such as wealth, friendship, and success, are not necessarily
zero-sum but are perceived so by some people under at least some conditions.
Zero-sum thinking is topical, has been given book-length popular treatments (e.g., Wright,
2000), and has featured in prominent forums for current affairs. If a situation is perceived as zero-
sum, those involved are likely to act in competition, and positive outcomes for both parties are
unlikely to result from negotiation (Gries, 2005). A Forbes online columnist (Kalgaard, 2006) called
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it the “worst disease” and laid its genesis at the feet of politicians
and their advisors who “occupy a zero-sum world... in which
one person’s gain is another’s loss.” A key dividing-point between
illiberal and liberal politics is whether wealth is zero-sum.
Zero-sum perceptions have also been claimed to contribute to
inter-group prejudice (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996) and public
resistance to immigration (Esses et al., 2001).
While much has been written about the consequences of zero-
sum beliefs, the causes of zero-sum beliefs and psychological
influences on them have received little attention, and likewise
issues involving the measurement of such beliefs. In one of the
few studies investigating causes of zero-sum beliefs, Meegan
(2010) speculates that zero-sum bias is linked to competitiveness,
and may have arisen as a form of cognitive adaptation. A
tendency for zero-sum thinking may well be predicted by specific
attitudes, cognitive styles or even personality traits, but this
possibility has not been systematically explored. In one of the few
relevant studies, Esses et al. (2001) report that individuals high in
Social Dominance Orientation are more likely to show zero-sum
tendencies when expressing attitudes about immigration.
Rozycka-Tran et al. (2015) recently report a 37-nation scale-
validation study of a 12-item “belief in zero-sum game” scale.
However, no researchers, to our awareness, have examined the
question of whether the degree to which people think a specific
proposition is zero-sum depends on how the proposition is
formed. This paper focuses on this question. Zero-sum candidate
statements have the form “The more of resource X for consumer
A, the less of resource Y for consumer B.” X and Y may be
either the same resource (such as time) or different resources
(e.g., “The more people commute by bicycle, the less revenue for
the city from car parking payments”). These statements have four
permutations when resource X is linked with consumer A and Y
with B:
1. “The more X for A, the less Y for B”
2. “The less X for A, the more Y for B”
3. “The more Y for B, the less X for A”
4. “The less Y for B, the more X for A”
A strict zero-sum believer should regard these four statements
as equally valid and therefore should endorse them equally. For
instance, if X and Y both are time, and A is being awake and B
is sleeping, then we should regard all four statements as equally
valid (e.g., “The more time for sleeping, the less time for being
awake” = “The more time for being awake, the less time for
sleeping”). We wish to make it clear that whether a statement
is zero-sum often is very much in the eye of the beholder. The
subject of our investigation is subjective beliefs about statements
that may or may not be zero-sum, rather than perceptions of
only those statements that are “objectively” zero-sum. The major
claim in this paper is that such statements often are endorsed
unequally in systematic ways even when they arguably are zero-
sum, depending on how the four elements (X, A, Y, and B) are
permuted and how people construe them.
Our claim is important for four reasons. First, it alerts
researchers to the fact that measuring zero-sum beliefs
involves some subtleties, because rearranging the elements of
zero-sum propositions can substantially affect people’s degrees
of self-reported belief in them. Second, it suggests that some
situations may be framed as zero-sum by describing them in
particular ways, but as not zero-sum if described in other ways.
A judicious choice of description therefore could head off zero-
sum thinking before it can affect a negotiation or relationship.
Third, this claim extends the topic of research on zero-sum beliefs
to include “partial” or “conditional” zero-sum beliefs (also see
Smithson et al., 2015). We will return to these points at the end
of the paper.
Fourth (and not least), this type of “order-effect” may crop
up in the measurement of other attitudes, and this paper
presents effective methods for investigating it. Order-effects are
commonplace in research on attitude measurement, decision
making, and consumer product evaluation and choice. For
example, a simple “primacy effect” is well-known, such that
the first alternative in a sequence of alternatives tends to be
preferred over the others (e.g., Mantonakis et al., 2009). Likewise,
people evaluate joint outcomes as better if they occur in an
improving sequence (e.g., worse-better) than if they occur in
a deteriorating sequence (better-worse; e.g., Hsee and Abelson,
1991; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993).
The type of order-effect we anticipate is partly due to the
fact that many zero-sum statements have the same form as
modus-ponens propositions. People may reasonably endorse a
modus-ponens proposition less strongly when the antecedent
and consequent are reversed (e.g., “If it is a seagull, then it is
a bird” vs. “If it is a bird, then it is a seagull”). Many attitude
measurement scales contain modus-ponens-like propositions,
and permuting the order of their components could influence
endorsement. Consider, for instance, “Cheating is not justified
because it is unfair to others” vs. “Cheating is unfair to others
because it is not justified” (the former is an item from Levenson
et al., 1995), or “If I feel competent, I am willing to take
responsibility for making decisions” vs. “If I am willing to take
responsibility for making decisions, I feel competent” (the former
is an item from Raskin and Terry, 1988).
We now turn to the task of building a case for our claim.
Consider the propositions “If your best friend increases the
attention they pay to someone else, they pay less attention to
you” vs. “If your best friend decreases the attention they pay to
someone else, they pay more attention to you.” The former may
make sense because there is a sense that the friend’s attention
is being tied up or committed to another person, so that is
attention no longer available for bestowing on you. In the
latter, the connection seems weaker. Investing less attention to
someone else does free it up, but it may be spent on someone
(or something) other than you. The intuition here is that if one
consumer (e.g., someone else) increases his/her possession of a
resource (your friend’s attention), another consumer (you) must
end up with less of it than could otherwise have been the case;
whereas if a consumer decreases his/her share of the resource,
it does not necessarily accrue to another particular consumer.
We shall call this intuition the “asymmetric resource flow” (ARF)
heuristic.
We use “heuristic” here similarly to its use in the decision-
making literature, i.e., to mean a common-sense intuition about
how the world works in the form of a rule-like proposition that
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can be used to form judgments or make decisions. Although
heuristics in this sense sometimes are associated with biases, we
are not claiming that the ARF or any other heuristic examined in
this paper involves or results in bias.
A second heuristic arises when people distinguish one
consumer as more potent or powerful than the other, thus
positioning the first consumer as a cause and the other as an
effect. In other words, they may view zero-sum propositions as
causal propositions and apply intuitive causal reasoning to them.
Consider the propositions “Devoting more time to work takes
time away from personal relationships” vs. “Devoting more time
to personal relationships takes time away from work.” You may
view time spent at work as controlled by external factors (such as
your supervisor), while time spent with personal relationships as
a matter of free choice. Increased demands for you to work more
hours will subtract from time available for personal relationships,
but increasing the time you put into relationships will not
affect your required working hours. These considerations would
lead you to agree more strongly with the first than with the
second proposition. We shall call this the “asymmetric consumer
potency” (ACP) heuristic.
From here on, we will need some notation to represent
the permutations of the elements in our propositions,
thereby enabling a short-hand representation of differential
endorsements of these permutations. To simplify, we will restrict
discussion to cases where there is just one resource (i.e., where X
= Y), or where each resource is tied to only one consumer (e.g., A
always is linked with X and B always is linked with Y). Our four
propositions are displayed in Table 1 with corresponding two-
letter notations denoting degree of endorsement. The upper-case
letter represents “more X” and the lower-case represents “less X.”
For example, Ab represents the strength of endorsement of the
proposition that “The more X for A, the less X for B.” Although
we do not treat such cases in this paper, if resources X and Y were
free to be permuted independently of consumers A and B then
we would need to extend this notation to index them as well, so
that we could distinguish between permutations such as “The
more X for A, the less Y for B” (denoted by AXby) from “The
more Y for A, the less X for B” (denoted by AYbx).
Thus, a test of whether the ARF heuristic holds is whether Ab
> aB and Ba > bA, because the order of A and B is constant in
each comparison. Likewise, a test of whether the ACP heuristic
holds, with Amore potent than B, is if Ab> Ba and aB> bA, and
the converse if B is more potent than A.
We report three studies. The first study is a “proof of concept”
investigation, testing whether the ACP and/or ARF patterns
are readily detectable in a variety of zero-sum statements and
TABLE 1 | Notation for strength of endorsement of zero-sum propositions.
Statement Notation
“The more X for A, the less X for B” Ab
“The less X for A, the more X for B” aB
“The more X for B, the less X for A” Ba
“The less X for B, the more X for A” bA
their permutations. A straightforward method of ascertaining
the existence of such differential endorsement patterns is
through two-alternative forced choice experiments, and this is
the approach employed in Study 1. Studies 2 and 3 utilize
conventional ordinal Likert scales measuring the degree to which
participants agree or disagree with statements. The use of rating-
scales enables a more nuanced analysis of any deviations from
equality of endorsements. To ensure that findings are not an
artifact of the number of points on the rating-scale, a 5-point
Likert format is employed in Study 2 and a 7-point format in
Study 3.
STUDY 1
Method
This study was conducted as an online experiment administered
through a QualtricsTM panel, subsequent to approval by
The Australian National University Human Research Ethics
Committee. The Qualtrics fee charged to researchers per
participant was $7.50USD. There were 508 completed surveys
by American participants (at least 18 years old), with a
mean age of 39.9 years (SD = 15.0), 50% of whom were
female. The median and interquartile deviation for the time
participants spent on the survey were 15.6 and 9.8 min,
respectively. Participant data were excluded from the analyses
if the participant spent less than 5 min on the survey,
“flat-lined” responses, or did not answer “paying attention”
questions correctly. The 5-min criterion was established on
the basis of pilot-testing, wherein we established that even
someone familiar with the questionnaire would take at least
5 min to complete it. “Flat-lining” refers to giving the same
response on Likert scales throughout an entire battery of
items. The usable cases included 205 females and 190 males
(total N = 395).
Table 2 displays the experimental design. The ACP column
contains the tests of the ACP heuristic’s components, and the
ARF column contains the tests of the asymmetric resource
commitment heuristic’s components. Both experimental factors
are between-subjects factors. The cells in the table describe 2-
alternative forced choice that participants were asked to make,
i.e., choosing which of the two permutations they agree with the
most strongly.
Examples of the zero-sum-like statements employed in this
study are shown in Table 3. The six statements were selected
from results of a pilot study (details of which available from
the first author) in which participants were asked to choose
between pairs of alternative permutations of various statements.
Statements were selected on the basis of how clear they were
TABLE 2 | Study 1 experimental design and logistic regression dummy
variables.
ACP ARF
Ab comparisons Ab vs. Ba (x1) aB vs. Ab
bA comparisons aB vs. bA (x2) bA vs. Ba (x3)
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TABLE 3 | Study 1 zero-sum propositions.
Item Label X/Y Example (Ab)
S1 Work-Personal Time Devoting more time to work (A) takes time away from personal relationships (b).
S2 Friends-Family Time Spending more time with friends (A) takes time away from family (b).
S3 Investment Money Investing more money in one venture (A) means there is less for the others (b).
S4 Best Friend Attention If my best friend increases the attention they pay to me (A), they pay less attention to someone else (b).
S5 Immigration-Jobs Immigration/Jobs If the rate of immigration (A) is increased there will be fewer jobs (b) to go around.
S6 Rich-Poor Wealth When the rich (A) get richer the poor (b) get poorer.
to participants and an absence of unanimous agreement or
unanimous disagreement with them.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four
conditions. After an introductory screen asking for informed
consent, the participants were asked on six occasions to choose
which of a pair of statements they agreed with the most. Each pair
consisted of two appropriate permutations of the jth statement
(for j = 1, ..., 6) from Table 3. Participants were then asked to
provide their age and gender, after which they were thanked and
debriefed via a closing information screen.
Results and Study 1 Discussion
Given that the dependent variable is binary and that the
parameters being estimated are probabilities of choosing one
alternative vs. the other, a normal-distribution linear regression
model is inappropriate. Instead, the six statement comparison
sets were initially analyzed with binary logistic regressions. The
purpose of these was to test for unequal splits among the
four permutations in each set. An absence of unequal splits
would indicate that either there were no preferences for one
permutation over another or the rather unlikely outcome that the
ACP and ARF heuristics both applied to the same degree. The
logistic regressions had the following form:
y′i = β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + β3x3i, (1)
where y′ denotes the logit of the expected probability of choosing
the left-most permutation in the pairs in Table 2 (e.g., choosing
Ab rather than Ba in the first cell inTable 2), and x1, x2, and x3 are
{0,1} dummy variables that take a value of 1 for the comparison
they are listed with in Table 2 (e.g., x1 = 1 when the choice
is between Ab vs. Ba, and otherwise x1 = 0). For statement
S1, the logistic model yielded y′i = −0.294 + 2.206x1i +
1.744x2i + 0.048x3i, and the likelihood ratio-test comparing
this model against its null, y′i = β0, counterpart resulted in
χ2
(3)
= 75.752 (p < 0.001). Five of the comparison sets’ logistic
regressions yielded significant effects from the experimental
manipulations [in comparisons against their null models, all χ2
(3)
> 21.0, p < 0.001], the exception being S3 [“Investing more
money...,” χ2
(3)
= 3.6, p= 0.312].
Table 4 displays the percentages and confidence intervals
for the relevant choices involving the six statements. These
percentages are linked to the logistic regressions in the usual
way. For instance, the percentages in the first row of Table 4
are derived as follows. The model for S1 described above yields
TABLE 4 | Choice percentages and 95% Confidence Intervals.
ACP ARF
S1: WORK-PERSONAL
Ab Ab > Ba: 87.1% [79.2%, 92.3%] Ab > aB: 57.3% [47.3%, 66.7%]
bA aB > bA: 81.0% [72.2%, 87.5%] Ba > bA: 56.1% [46.3%, 65.5%]
S2: FRIENDS-FAMILY
Ab Ab > Ba: 79.2% [70.3%, 86.0%] Ab > aB: 38.8% [29.7%, 48.7%]
bA aB > bA: 86.0% [77.9%, 91.5%] Ba > bA: 74.0% [64.4%, 81.7%]
S3: INVESTMENT
Ab Ab > Ba: 51.0% [41.3%, 60.7%] Ab > aB: 52.5% [42.8%, 61.9%]
bA aB > bA: 61.5% [51.5%, 70.6%] Ba > bA: 49.0% [39.4%, 58.7%]
S4: BEST FRIEND
Ab Ab > Ba: 54.1% [44.2%, 63.6%] Ab > aB: 64.0% [54.2%, 72.7%]
bA aB > bA: 64.6% [54.6%, 73.4%] Ba > bA: 61.4% [51.6%, 70.3%]
S5: IMMIGRATION-JOBS
Ab Ab > Ba: 74.5% [65.0%, 82.1%] Ab > aB: 50.5% [40.9%, 60.1%]
bA aB > bA: 78.1% [68.9%, 85.2%] Ba > bA: 56.0% [46.2%, 65.3%]
S6: RICH-POOR
Ab Ab > Ba: 83.2% [74.7%, 89.2%] Ab > aB: 80.6% [71.7%, 87.2%]
bA aB > bA: 35.0% [26.4%, 44.7%] Ba > bA: 21.9% [14.8%, 31.1%]
exp(−0.294+ 2.206)/(1+ exp(−0.294+ 2.206))= 0.871 for the
probability of choosing Ab over Ba (thus, 87.1%), and 1/(1 +
exp(−0.294)) = 0.573 for the probability of choosing Ab over aB
(57.3%).
Components of the ACP pattern are found in 9 out of
12 comparisons, mostly with substantial majorities. The single
counter-example is the aB vs. bA comparison in S6. A complete
ACP test requires both Ab > Ba and aB > bA, and we can see
in Table 4 that this test is passed by S1, S2, and S5. Components
of the ARF pattern are found in 3 out of 12 comparisons, with
a complete ARF pattern in S4. There are two counter-examples,
the Ab vs. aB comparison in S2 and the Ba vs. bA comparison
in S6. We therefore have evidence suggesting that both the ACP
and ARF patterns can be manifested in zero-sum-like statements.
In contrast, S3 is the only statement that fitted a strict zero-
sum pattern in the sense that no permutation was significantly
preferred over any other. A possible explanation for this is that
it is the only statement in which the resource is wealth. In any
case, the “proof of concept” has been demonstrated: Asymmetric
zero-sum-like statement endorsements are not difficult to find.
The pattern in S6 (Rich-Poor) fits neither the ACP nor
the ARF heuristic, but reveals another striking combination of
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unequal endorsements: Ab > Ba and Ab > aB, whereas bA > aB
and bA > Ba. In short, gains for A paired with losses for B are
chosen over their opposites in all four relevant comparisons. In
the context of S6, this amounts to a greater belief in scenarios
where the rich are getting richer while the poor get poorer, than
in scenarios where the poor are getting richer while the rich get
poorer. One way of interpreting this pattern is that gains have a
greater potency for one consumer than for the other, so we shall
refer to this pattern as the “asymmetric gains potency” (AGP)
heuristic.
STUDY 2
This study was designed to extend the investigation of
asymmetric zero-sum beliefs in four respects. First, rating-
scales were employed instead of two-alternative forced-choice
formats, to surmount some of the limitations of those formats
but also to ensure that the findings in Study 1 were not
an artifact of task demands or response formats. Second,
permutations of zero-sum-like propositions were arranged as
a between-subjects factor, to ascertain whether the patterns of
differential endorsement identified in Study 1 are replicated
between as well as within participants, and also to enable all six
comparisons among the permutations (Study 1 was limited to
four comparisons). Third, we aimed to test the applicability of
the heuristics identified in Study 1 by constructing zero-sum-like
propositions intended to produce specific endorsement patterns.
Fourth, we wished to determine the generalizability of the
findings in Study 1 and this study as well, at least across
more than one English-speaking culture. In addition to testing
a culture that is fairly similar to the USA, we also wished to
sample from a culture that is less individualistic. Gelfand and
Christakopoulou (1999) present arguments and evidence that
members of less individualistic societies may be less inclined
to hold zero-sum beliefs than those in strongly individualistic
societies. Accordingly, we recruited samples from the USA, UK,
and India. However, we wish to make it clear that an in-depth
cross-cultural analysis is not within the scope of this paper.
Instead, in this and Study 3 to follow, we are attempting to test
our hypotheses on populations that are not “W.E.I.R.D.” (i.e.,
Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, Developed; Henrich et al.,
2010). That said, we recognize that Qualtrics panel samples are
not random samples, and may or may not be representative of
their referent populations.
Study 2 included four of the zero-sum-like propositions from
Study 1 for purposes of replication, and four new propositions
to test predictions of endorsement patterns. Permutations were
arranged as between-subjects factors, and Likert rating scales
were employed to measure endorsement. Study 2 also was
embedded in a larger study involving individual-differences
measures (described below, with findings reported in Smithson
and Shou, 2016).
Method
Participants
There were 496 completed surveys by adult participants
(at least 18 years old), from each of the three countries,
each with 50% males. The Qualtrics fee per participant was
$8.17USD. The median and interquartile deviation for the
time participants spent on the survey were 13.0 and 9.0
min, respectively. Participant data were excluded from the
analyses if the participant spent less than 5 min on the survey,
“flat-lined” responses, or did not answer “paying attention”
questions correctly. The usable samples were as follows. The
USA sample included 405 people, of whom 46.1% were males,
and whose mean and standard deviation of age were 49.6
and 15.5, respectively. The UK sample included 426 people,
of whom 49.3% were males, and whose mean and standard
deviation of age were 46.6 and 18.2, respectively. The India
sample included 452 people, of whom 51.8% were males, and
whose mean and standard deviation of age were 37.5 and 17.2,
respectively.
Materials and Design
The study included two major parts, the zero-sum questions and
a battery of items measuring the Big-5 personality factors (the
BFI version: John et al., 1991), Social Dominance Orientation
(Ho et al., 2012), and CompetitiveWorld View Perry et al. (2013).
These individual difference measures are not discussed here, but
their rationale and complete analysis may be found in Smithson
and Shou (2016). The order of presentation of these two parts was
counterbalanced. The zero-sum-like propositions were permuted
in a between-subjects factor with four levels (as in Study 1; see
Table 2). The overall design, therefore, was a 2 (orders) × 4
(permutations) factorial between-subjects experiment.
Table 5 displays the zero-sum-like propositions used in this
study. Four of them (starred) are replications of propositions
from Study 1. S1 and S5 were retained as exemplars of the ACP
heuristic pattern in Study 1, S4 was retained because it exhibited
the ARF pattern, and S6 because it revealed the AGP pattern. The
new propositions were constructed for the following purposes:
S2 and S3 were constructed to yield the ACP pattern, S7 was
intended to produce the AGP pattern, and S8 was intended to
provide a strict zero-sum pattern. Endorsement of the zero-sum-
like propositions was measured by a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
Procedure
This study was conducted as an online experiment administered
through a QualtricsTM panel, subsequent to approval by
The Australian National University Human Research Ethics
Committee. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the eight conditions. After an introductory screen asking for
informed consent, the participants completed the individual
differences measures and zero-sum-like proposition questions
in the order determined by the condition to which they were
assigned. Participants were then asked to provide their country
of origin, English language background, education level, age, and
gender, after which they were thanked and debriefed via a closing
information screen.
Results
Ordinal logistic regression was used to analyze these data (using
the cumulative logit model in the VGAM package in R, Yee,
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TABLE 5 | Study 2 zero-sum propositions.
Item Label Example (Ab)
S1* Work-personal Devoting more time to work (A) takes time away
from personal relationships (B).
S2 Distance-time The longer the distance (A) from A to B, the more
time (B) it takes to get from A to B.
S3 Eat-weigh The more I eat (A), the more I weigh (B).
S4* Best friend If my best friend increases the attention they pay to
someone else (B), they pay less attention to me (A).
S5* Immigration-jobs If the rate of immigration (A) is increased there will
be fewer jobs (B) to go around.
S6* Rich-poor When the rich (A) get richer the poor (B) get poorer.
S7 Food-clothes Spending more money on clothes (A) means there is
less money to spend on food (B).
S8 Cloudy-sunny The more hours of cloudy weather (A), the fewer
hours of sunshine in a day (B).
*Replicated statements from Study 1.
2010). The dependent variable in all analyses is a categorical
ordinal Likert scale, so the suitability of this technique and,
likewise, the inappropriateness of normal-distribution-theory
linear regression are self-evident. Owing to the large sample
sizes, a significance criterion of 0.01 rather than the conventional
0.05 was adopted for model comparison purposes via likelihood-
ratio tests. The primary comparisons of interest were between
models restricted to main effects for country and statement
permutation, and models that included moderator effects from
country. The LL Ratio p column in Table 6 shows the p-values
for the likelihood-ratio tests comparing these models for each
of the eight statements (all p-values for main-effects models
compared to intercept-only models were <0.001, so they are
not reported here). S5 and S6 had moderation effects that
significantly contributed to the models’ goodness of fit and were
retained in the final model. The other statements’ final models are
main-effects models.
Exponentiated ordinal logistic regression coefficients have an
odds-ratios interpretation that we utilize to present the results for
comparisons such as aB with bA, rather than flooding this paper
with tables of coefficients. In the first statement below, the main-
effects model including the statement comparison and country
terms can be written as
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SBa − β2SAb − β3SbA − γ1CIndia − γ2CUK
= αj − 0.830SBa + 0.699SAb − 0.872SbA
−0.148CIndia − 0.035CUK (2)
The αj is the threshold parameter for the j
th cumulative logits
(effectively these are “nuisance” parameters, and in this model
their values are α1 = −3.439, α2 = −1.277, α3 = −0.206,
and α4 = 1.854), the Sk are dummy variables for the item
permutations, and the Cm are dummy variables for the countries
(note the negative coefficient signs, as the ordinal logistic
model is parameterized in the VGAM package). For the item
permutations, the reference category is the aB combination
[Devoting less time to work (a) makes more time for personal
TABLE 6 | Study 2 logistic regression model odds-ratio summaries.
Prop. LL ratio p Sample Odds-ratios
ACP + partial ARF Ab > Ba aB > bA Ab > aB Ba < bA
S1 0.010 All 4.61 2.39 2.01
S2 0.035 All 4.08 1.74 1.38 1.69
S3 0.050 All 4.07 1.84 1.97
S5 <0.001 USA 4.32 3.33 1.68
India – – –
UK 6.01 2.66 2.05
Partial ARF + Partial ACP Ab > ba aB > bA Ba > bA
S4 0.733 All 1.46 1.60 1.58
S8 0.041 All 3.49 2.26 2.23
AGP Ab > Ba Ab > aB bA > aB bA > Ba
S6 0.003 USA 6.61 6.37 4.27 4.43
India 12.94 5.53 5.32 12.44
UK 4.02 2.57 3.43 5.37
S7 0.054 All – 2.45 3.58 1.35
relationships (B)]. The coefficient comparing aB and bA is 0.872
(z = 6.12, p < 0.001), and exp(0.872) = 2.39. Because of the
negative coefficient signs, for any two-way split of our 5-point
scale (e.g., 1−2 vs. 3−5), the odds of aB being rated in the
upper part (e.g., a score of 3−5) of the scale is 2.39 times
greater than the odds of bA being rated in the upper part
of the scale, so we have aB > bA, which is part of the ACP
pattern.
We now present the results for each of the eight
propositions in turn. Table 6 displays the odds-ratio
summaries for these propositions, grouped according to
shared patterns of permutation effects. The histograms referred
to throughout this section are in Appendix A in Supplementary
Material.
S1: Devoting more time to work (A) takes time away from
personal relationships (B). The ACP pattern in the histograms
is clear (aB > bA and Ab > Ba), and is backed up by the
relevant odds-ratios. From equation (2), we have already seen
that exponentiating the coefficient showing that aB > bA yields
the odds-ratio exp(0.872)= 2.39. Comparing Ab with Ba requires
exponentiating the appropriate combination of coefficients from
equation (2) because aB is the referent category, thus, exp(0.830
+ 0.699) = 4.61. Both comparisons thereby replicate the finding
in Study 1. There is also one component of the ARF pattern
(Ab > aB, odds-ratio exp(0.699) = 2.01). As this pattern crops
up in subsequent results, we shall refer to it as a “partial ARF.”
As indicated in Table 6, there is a borderline-significant country
moderator effect. The UK and USA samples exhibit the pattern
just described, whereas the India sample has only one component
of ACP (Ab > Ba, odds-ratio = 2.83) and otherwise also fits this
pattern.
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S2: The longer the distance (A) from A to B, the more time (B)
it takes to get from A to B. The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SBa − γ1CIndia − γ2CUK
= αj + 0.878SAb + 0.555SaB − 0.527SBa
+ 0.268CIndia − 0.669CUK (3)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. This proposition was predicted to exhibit the
ACP pattern, and, as can be seen in the histograms, it does
so. From equation (3) we have Ab > Ba and aB > bA
[ACP, with odds-ratios exp(0.878 + 0.527) = 4.08 and exp
(0.555) = 1.74, respectively], Ab > aB [partial ARF, odds-ratio
exp(0.878− 0.555) = 1.38), and Ba < bA (odds-ratio exp(0.527)
= 1.69].
S3: The more I eat (A), the more I weigh (B). The model for this
item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SBa − γ1CIndia − γ2CUK
= αj + 1.287SAb + 0.608SaB − 0.116SBa
− 0.120CIndia − 0.047CUK (4)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. This proposition also was predicted to exhibit the
ACP pattern, and as the histograms demonstrate, it does. From
equation (4) we have Ab > Ba and aB > bA [ACP, odds-ratios
exp(1.287 + 0.116) = 4.07 and exp(0.608) = 1.84, respectively],
and Ab> aB [partial ARF, odds-ratio exp(1.287− 0.608)= 1.97].
S4: If my best friend increases the attention they pay to me
(A), they pay less attention to someone else (B). The model for
this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SBa − β2SbA − β3SAb − γ1CIndia − γ2CUK
= αj − 0.011SBa − 0.471SbA − 0.094SAb
+ 0.399CIndia − 0.061CUK (5)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the aB
combination. This proposition produced the ARF pattern in
Study 1, but in this study it only partially does this, while
exhibiting another distinctive pattern. In the histograms, it is
apparent that aB > bA, Ab > bA, and Ba > bA. From equation
(5) we have odds-ratios exp(0.471) = 1.60, exp(0.471 − 0.094) =
1.46, and exp(0.471 − 0.011) = 1.58, respectively. There are no
other inequalities in endorsement among the four permutations.
This pattern is a combination of ARF and ACP, which we shall
denote by “partial ARF+ partial ACP.”
S5: If the rate of immigration (A) is increased there will be fewer
jobs (B) to go around. In Study 1 this proposition produced an
ACP pattern, and the histograms suggest that it does so here too.
However, the findings are somewhat more complex. The model
for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SBa − γ1CIndia − γ2CUK
− δ11SAbCIndia − δ12SAbCUK − δ21SaBCIndia
− δ22SaBCUK − δ31SBaCIndia − δ32SBaCUK
= αj + 1.721SAb + 1.202SaB + 0.258SBa
+ 1.304CIndia + 0.283CUK − 1.780SAbCIndia
+ 0.023SAbCUK − 1.113SaBCIndia − 0.223SaBCUK
+ 0.095SBaCIndia − 0.308SBaCUK (6)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. The USA and UK samples exhibit the full ACP
pattern (replicating Study 1), as well as Ab > aB (partial ARF).
In the USA sample, the odds-ratios for Ab > Ba and aB >
bA (ACP) are exp(1.721 − 0.258) = 4.32 and exp(1.202) =
3.33, respectively; while in the UK sample these odds-ratios are
exp(1.721 − 0.258 + 0.023 + 0.308) = 6.01 and exp(1.202 −
0.223) = 2.66. However, the India sample shows no significant
differences in endorsement of any permutations, i.e., a consistent
zero-sum pattern. The net Ab, aB, and Ba coefficients for the
Indian sample are 1.721− 1.780=−0.059 (z=−0.25, p> 0.05),
1.202 − 1.113 = 0.089 (z = 0.38, p > 0.05), and 0.258 + 0.095 =
0.353 (z = 1.49, p> 0.05), respectively.
S6:When the rich (A) get richer the poor (B) get poorer. In Study
1, this proposition revealed the AGP pattern described earlier. In
the histograms, this pattern is quite evidently replicated, despite
country moderator effects. The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SBa − γ1CIndia
− γ2CUK − δ11SAbCIndia − δ12SAbCUK
− δ21SaBCIndia − δ22SaBCUK − δ31SBaCIndia
− δ32SBaCUK
= αj + 0.400SAb − 1.451SaB − 1.489SBa
+ 0.753CIndia + 0.318CUK − 0.361SAbCIndia
− 0.688SAbCUK − 0.220SaBCIndia + 0.219SaBCUK
− 1.032SBaCIndia − 0.191SBaCUK (7)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. We have the full AGP pattern, Ab > Ba, Ab > aB,
bA > aB, and bA > Ba in the three samples. The USA sample
odds-ratios are exp(0.400+ 1.489)= 6.61, exp(0.400+ 1.451)=
6.37, exp(1.451) = 4.27, and exp(1.489) = 4.43, respectively. The
UK sample odds-ratios are exp(0.400 + 1.489 − 0.688 + 0.191)
= 4.02, exp(0.400 + 1.451 − 0.688 − 0.219) = 2.57, exp(1.451
− 0.219) = 3.43, and exp(1.489 + 0.191) = 5.37, respectively.
And the India sample odds-ratios are exp(0.400 + 1.489 − 0.361
+ 1.032) = 12.94, exp(0.400 + 1.451 − 0.361 + 0.220) = 5.53,
exp(1.451 + 0.220) = 5.32, and exp(1.489 + 1.032) = 12.44,
respectively.
S7: Spending more money on food (A) means there is less money
to spend on clothes (B). The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SBa − β2SAb − β3SbA − γ1CIndia − γ2CUK
= αj + 0.976SBa + 0.895SAb + 1.276SbA
− 0.813CIndia + 0.008CUK (8)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the aB
combination. This proposition was predicted to produce the AGP
pattern. Inspection of the histograms reveals that the results do
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not quite fit this pattern. Instead, from equation (8) we have
Ab > aB [odds-ratio exp(0.895) = 2.45), bA > aB (odds-ratio
exp(1.276) = 3.58), and bA > Ba (odds-ratio exp(1.276 − 0.976)
= 1.35], but not Ab > Ba (therefore, not quite AGP). It also is
clear that all permutations are more strongly endorsed than aB.
S8: The more hours of cloudy weather (A), the fewer hours of
sunshine in a day (B). The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SbA − γ1CIndia − γ2CUK
= αj + 0.445SAb + 0.010SaB − 0.804SbA
− 0.014CIndia − 0.107CUK (9)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the Ba
combination. This proposition was predicted to produce a
consistent zero-sum pattern, i.e., with no unequal endorsements
among permutations. The histograms show that this prediction
has proved incorrect. Instead, from equation (9) we have the
partial ARF + partial ACP pattern found in S4: Ab > bA [odds-
ratio exp(0.445 + 0.804) = 3.49], aB > bA [odds-ratio exp(0.010
+ 0.804)= 2.26], and Ba> bA [odds-ratio exp(0.804)= 2.23].
Study 2 Discussion
Study 2 partly replicated and extended the findings from Study
1. S1 and S5 both were expected to yield the ACP pattern, which
they did for the USA and UK samples although not for the Indian
sample. S1 and S5 also exhibited a partial ARF pattern, which
Study 1 was incapable of detecting, and which was echoed in S2
and S3. We shall denote this pattern by “partial ARF + ACP.”
S4 partially replicated the ARF finding from Study 1, yielding the
partial ARF + partial ACP pattern for all three samples. Finally,
S6 replicated the AGP pattern from Study 1 for all three samples.
Overall, the evidence suggests that most of the heuristic patterns
identified in Study 1 may generalize across English-speaking
cultures.
Turning now to the predictions regarding the new items,
both S2 and S3 were predicted to have the ACP pattern and
yielded partial ARF + ACP. The other two predictions were
disconfirmed. S7 did not produce the AGP pattern, nor did S8
yield a strict zero-sum result. Instead, S8 showed partial ARF +
partial ACP and S7 showed an inverted version of the partial ARF
+ ACP pattern. Again, these patterns held for all three samples,
indicating English-speaking cross-cultural generality.
New and consistent outcomes in Study 2 are the partial ARF
+ partial ACP and partial ARF + ACP patterns. Study 1 was
incapable of revealing these patterns, so they are very likely
due to the additional comparisons among permutations made
possible in Study 2. These combinations were observed in all
of the statements except for S6 and S7. None of the statements
exhibited ACP on its own, but always in conjunction with a
partial or full ARF pattern. The greatest consistency of this
combination was found for the USA and UK samples, but it
also occurred in the Indian sample for S2, S3, S4, and S8. The
fact that this pattern was obtained even for the objectively zero-
sum S8 indicates its pervasiveness in people’s interpretations of
zero-sum-like statements.
STUDY 3
Study 3 was designed to test the generality of the results from
Studies 1 and 2 in two respects. First, the rating scale was
expanded from 5 to 7 bins, to test whether any of the patterns
identified in the previous studies might be artifacts of the scale
response format. To do this, six of the Study 2 statements were
retained for Study 3 and adult samples were obtained again
from the USA, UK, and India. Second, cross-cultural generality
was further tested by translating the items into Chinese and
obtaining a sample of adult Chinese responses. The goal here was
to explore whether the same patterns would emerge when the
zero-sum-like statements are expressed in a language unrelated
to English. Again, the goal here is not in-depth cross-cultural
comparisons, but simply to replicate and extend the findings of
the preceding studies, while gaining preliminary indications of
whether language makes a difference.
Method
Participants
As in the preceding studies, participant data were excluded
from the analyses if the participant spent less than 5 min on
the survey, “flat-lined” responses, or did not answer “paying
attention” questions correctly. However, in this study we
recruited participants until we had attained very close to an
even gender split and 500 participants in each country fulfilling
these criteria. The Qualtrics fee per participant was $8.50USD.
The median and interquartile deviation for the time participants
spent on the survey were 13.0 min and 10.0 min, respectively.
The usable USA sample included 498 people (out of 510 total),
whose mean and standard deviation of age were 45.8 and 15.6,
respectively. The UK sample included 494 people (out of 511
total), whose mean and standard deviation of age were 51.6 and
14.4, respectively. The India sample included 503 people (out of
513 total), whose mean and standard deviation of age were 36.4
and 14.2, respectively. The China sample included 496 people
(out of 506 total), whosemean and standard deviation of age were
32.3 and 7.8, respectively.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
As in Study 2, this study included two major parts, the zero-
sum questions and a set of individual differences covariates, the
findings for which are reported in Smithson and Shou (2016). The
covariates consisted of subscales of two psychopathy inventories,
the LSRP (Levenson et al., 1995), and the SRP II (Lester et al.,
2012). The order of presentation of the zero-sum-like items and
psychopathy inventories was counterbalanced in each of the four
samples.
Table 7 displays the zero-sum-like propositions used in this
study. Two of them (S2 and S3) are replicates of statements
from Study 1 that were not retested in Study 2. Four others
(S1, S4, S5, and S6) are replicates of items from Study 2
that also were employed in Study 1. The remaining two (S7
and S8) are new items, designed to test hypotheses regarding
marginalizing racism (Smithson et al., 2015). They are analyzed
here because they also were predicted to exhibit the AGP pattern.
Endorsement of the zero-sum-like propositions was measured
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TABLE 7 | Study 3 zero-sum propositions.
Item Label Example (Ab)
S1* Work-personal Devoting more time to work (A) takes time away
from personal relationships (B).
S2# Friends-family Spending more time with friends (A) takes time
away from family (B).
S3# Investment Investing more money in one venture (A) means
there is less for the others (B).
S4* Best friend If my best friend increases the attention they pay to
someone else (B), they pay less attention to me (A).
S5* Immigration-jobs If the rate of immigration (A) is increased there will
be fewer jobs (B) to go around.
S6* Rich-poor When the rich (A) get richer the poor (B) get poorer.
S7 Al-Bayati : Consider Hama Al-Bayati, who immigrated to the
U.S.A. (U.K., India) 5 years ago from Iraq. The more
“Iraqi” (A) he is, the less “American” (“British,”
“Indian”) (B) he will be.
S8 Al-Husseni : Consider Ali Al-Husseni, who immigrated to
Germany 5 years ago from Iraq. The more “Iraqi” (A)
he is, the less “German” (B) he will be.
#Replicated statements from Study 1.
*Replicated statements from Studies 1 and 2.
by a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree.”
The Chinese version of the online survey was translated
into simplified Chinese and back-translated into English by
two native-speakers of Chinese who are fluent in English. The
S7 and S8 items are not relevant in Chinese society because
immigration to China is rare, so substitutes were constructed that
refer to a Chinese citizenmigrating from one province to another.
The substitute for statement 1 had the person immigrating to
the home province of the respondent, while the substitute for
statement 2 had the person immigrating to another province
(Xinjiang).
This study was conducted as an online experiment
administered through a QualtricsTM panel, subsequent to
approval by The Australian National University Human
Research Ethics Committee. The procedure was identical to that
in Study 2.
Results
Ordinal logistic regression was employed for analyzing the data
in the sameway that it was in Study 2. The same criteria formodel
comparison also were used. The LL Ratio p column in Table 8
displays the p-values for the likelihood-ratio tests between main-
effects and moderator-effects models (all p-values for main-
effects models compared to intercept-only models were <0.001,
so they are not reported here). Moderator-effects models are the
final models for statements 1, 5, and 6, as in Study 2, but also for
statements 2 and 4 (unlike in Study 2), and 7 and 8.
Study 3 S1: Devoting more time to work (A) takes time away
from personal relationships (B). Appendix B in Supplementary
Material displays the histograms for the four permutations of S1.
The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SBa − β2SAb − β3SbA − γ1CUK − γ2CInd
TABLE 8 | Study 3 logistic regression model odds-ratio summaries.
Prop. LL ratio p Sample Odds-ratios
ACP + partial ARF Ab > Ba aB > bA Ab > aB Ba < bA
S1 <0.001 USA 6.82 1.73 2.20
UK 8.58 6.89 3.35
India 2.16 2.25 1.36
China 4.62 2.64 3.42
S2 0.003 USA 2.39 4.95
UK 2.14 3.22
India 2.16 6.05
China 2.53 1.88
S5 <0.001 USA 6.05 5.31
UK 12.68 3.42 Ba > bA
India 1.68
China 2.08 1.41
S3 0.456 All
Partial ARF + Partial ACP Ab > ba aB > bA Ba > bA
S4 0.009 USA 2.36 1.80 1.79
UK 1.82 2.18 2.08
India 2.59 1.72 1.86
China 2.27 1.73
AGP Ab > Ba Ab > aB bA > aB bA > Ba
S6 <0.001 USA 2.75 3.39 5.75 4.66
UK 9.58 8.67 8.76 9.68
India 12.43 9.68 10.80 13.87
China 6.62 3.46 4.01 7.69
S7 <0.001 USA 2.20 2.48 2.29 2.03
UK 11.13 10.28 11.25 12.18
India 4.85 2.25 2.46
China 1.77 1.92 2.46 2.48
S8 <0.001 USA 2.14 2.92 2.41 1.77
UK 10.59 10.07 7.10 7.46
India 4.71 4.57 2.46 2.53
China 1.75 2.66 2.27 1.49
− γ3CCh − δ11SBaCUK − δ12SBaCInd − δ13SBaCCh
− δ21SAbCUK − δ22SAbCInd − δ23SAbCCh
− δ31SbACUK − δ32SbACInd − δ33SbACCh
= αj − 1.13SBa + 0.79SAb − 0.55SbA + 0.71CUK
− 0.77CInd − 0.60CCh − 0.65SBaCUK
+ 1.63SBaCInd + 0.83SBaCCh − 0.42SAbCUK
+ 0.48SAbCInd − 0.44SAbCCh − 1.38SbACUK
+ 0.26SbACInd − 0.19SbACCh (10)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the
aB combination. Equation (10) shows that there are country
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moderator effects to take into account. Nevertheless, all four
samples follow the partial ARF + ACP pattern, i.e., the ACP
pattern [Ab > Ba and aB > bA: USA odds-ratios exp(1.13 +
0.79) = 6.82 and exp(0.55) = 1.73, respectively; UK odds-ratios
exp(1.13 + 0.79 + 0.65 − 0.42) = 8.58 and exp(0.55 + 1.38) =
6.89, respectively; India odds-ratios exp(1.13 + 0.79 − 1.63 +
0.48)= 2.16 and exp(0.55+ 0.26)= 2.25, respectively; and China
odds-ratios exp(1.13 + 0.79 − 0.83 + 0.44) = 4.62 and exp(0.55
+ 0.42) = 2.64, respectively], and a partial ARF pattern [Ab >
aB: USA odds-ratio exp(0.79) = 2.20, UK odds-ratio exp(0.79 +
0.42)= 3.35, India odds-ratio exp(0.79− 0.48)= 1.36, and China
odds-ratio exp(0.79 + 0.44) = 3.42], thereby replicating these
findings in Study 2 and extending them to the Chinese sample.
Study 3 S2: Spending more time with friends (A) takes time
away from family (B). Study 1 suggested that this proposition
would exhibit the ACP pattern, and the histograms in Appendix
B in Supplementary Material suggest that it does this. The model
for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SBa − β3SaB − γ1CUK − γ2CInd
− γ3CCh − δ11SAbCUK − δ12SAbCInd − δ13SAbCCh
− δ21SBaCUK − δ22SBaCInd − δ23SBaCCh
− δ31SaBCUK − δ32SaBCInd − δ33SaBCCh
= αj + 1.31SAb + 0.44SBa + 1.60SaB + 0.15CUK
− 0.08CInd + 0.51CCh − 0.38SAbCUK
+ 0.14SAbCInd − 0.01SAbCCh − 0.27SBaCUK
+ 0.24SBaCInd + 0.07SBaCCh
− 0.43SaBCUK + 0.20SaBCInd − 0.97SaBCCh (11)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. From equation (11), all four samples follow the
ACP pattern [Ab> Ba and aB> bA: USA odds-ratios exp(1.31−
0.44) = 2.39 and exp(1.60) = 4.95, respectively; UK odds-ratios
exp(1.31 − 0.44 − 0.38 + 0.27) = 2.14 and exp(1.60 − 0.43) =
3.22, respectively; India odds-ratios exp(1.31 − 0.44 + 0.14 −
0.24)= 2.16 and exp(1.60+ 0.20)= 6.05, respectively; and China
odds-ratios exp(1.31− 0.44− 0.01+ 0.07)= 2.53 and exp(1.60−
0.97) = 1.88, respectively], thereby replicating the Study 1 result
and extending it to the UK, India, and China.
Study 3 S3: Investing more money in one venture (A) means
there is less for the others (B). The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SBa − γ1CUK
− γ2CInd − γ3CCh
= αj − 0.21SAb − 0.48SaB − 0.24SBa
+ 0.17CUK + 0.69CInd + 0.80CCh (12)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. The Study 1 finding for this proposition indicated
no significantly unequal endorsement of any of the four
permutations. Although a log-likelihood ratio-test comparing a
model with only main effects for country with one that adds main
effects for permutation is significant (p<0.001), the only notable
difference is bA > aB (odds-ratio exp(0.48) = 1.62). All other
comparisons have odds-ratios of less than 1.3.
Study 3 S4: If my best friend increases the attention they pay to
someone else (B), they pay less attention to me (A). The model for
this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SBa − β2SbA − β3SAb − γ1CUK − γ2CInd
− γ3CCh − δ11SBaCUK − δ12SBaCInd − δ13SBaCCh
− δ21SbACUK − δ22SbACInd − δ23SbACCh
− δ31SAbCUK − δ32SAbCInd − δ33SAbCCh
= αj − 0.01SBa − 0.59SbA + 0.27SAb − 0.01CUK
+ 0.34CInd + 0.58CCh + 0.04SBaCUK
− 0.09SBaCInd − 0.26SBaCCh − 0.19SbACUK
+ 0.05SbACInd − 0.23SbACCh − 0.45SAbCUK
− 0.14SAbCInd − 1.22SAbCCh (13)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the aB
combination. Study 2 indicated that this proposition has the
partial ARF + partial ACP pattern Ab > bA, aB > bA, and Ba
> bA, and and the histograms in Appendix B in Supplementary
Material suggest the same pattern. From equation (13), three of
the samples display this pattern [USA odds-ratios exp(0.59 +
0.27) = 2.36, exp(0.59) = 1.80, and exp(0.59 − 0.01) = 1.79,
respectively; UK odds-ratios exp(0.59 + 0.27 + 0.19 − 0.45) =
1.82, exp(0.59+ 0.19)= 2.18, and exp(0.59− 0.01+ 0.19− 0.04)
= 2.08, respectively; and India odds-ratios exp(0.59 + 0.27 −
0.05+ 0.14)= 2.59, exp(0.59− 0.05)= 1.72, and exp(0.59− 0.01
− 0.05 + 0.09) = 1.86, respectively]. China partially replicates it
with an ARF pattern (aB> bA and Ba> bA: odds-ratios exp(0.59
+ 0.23) = 2.27 and exp(0.59 − 0.01 + 0.23 − 0.26) = 1.73,
respectively).
Study 3 S5: If the rate of immigration (A) is increased there
will be fewer jobs (B) to go around. In Study 2 this proposition
produced the partial ARF + ACP pattern (except for the India
sample), and the histograms in Appendix B in Supplementary
Material suggest that it does so here. The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SBa − γ1CUK − γ2CInd
− γ3CCh − δ11SAbCUK − δ12SAbCInd − δ13SAbCCh
− δ21SaBCUK − δ22SaBCInd − δ23SaBCCh
− δ31SBaCUK − δ32SBaCInd − δ33SBaCCh
= αj + 1.96SAb + 1.67SaB + 0.16SBa + 0.82CUK
+ 1.63CInd + 0.86CCh − 0.09SAbCUK
− 1.70SAbCInd − 1.59SAbCCh − 0.44SaBCUK
− 1.55SaBCInd − 1.33SaBCCh − 0.83SBaCUK
+ 0.36SBaCInd − 0.52SBaCCh (14)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. Taking country moderator effects into account, the
USA, UK, and China samples exhibit the full ACP pattern [Ab>
Ba and aB > bA: USA odds-ratios exp(1.96 − 0.16) = 6.05 and
exp(1.67)= 5.31, respectively; UK odds-ratios exp(1.96− 0.09−
0.16 + 0.83) = 12.68 and exp(1.67 − 0.44) = 3.42, respectively;
and China odds-ratios exp(1.96− 0.16− 1.59+ 0.52)= 2.08 and
exp(1.67− 1.33)= 1.41, respectively]. The USA and UK samples
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also have the partial ARF pattern, Ab > aB [USA odds-ratio
exp(1.96 − 1.67) = 1.34 and UK odds-ratio exp(1.96 − 1.67 −
0.09 + 0.44) = 1.90). However, the India sample shows only one
inequality in endorsement: Ba> bA (odds-ratio exp(0.16+ 0.36)
= 1.68].
Study 3 S6: When the rich (A) get richer the poor (B) get poorer.
In Studies 1 and 2, this proposition yielded the AGP pattern. The
histograms in Appendix B in Supplementary Material show this
pattern clearly. The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SaB − β3SBa − γ1CUK − γ2CInd
− γ3CCh − δ11SAbCUK − δ12SAbCInd − δ13SAbCCh
− δ21SaBCUK − δ22SaBCInd − δ23SaBCCh
− δ31SBaCUK − δ32SBaCInd − δ33SBaCCh
= αj − 0.53SAb − 1.75SaB − 1.54SBa + 0.38CUK
+ 0.69CInd + 0.24CCh + 0.52SAbCUK
+ 0.42SAbCInd + 0.38SAbCCh − 0.42SaBCUK
− 0.63SaBCInd + 0.36SaBCCh − 0.73SBaCUK
− 1.09SBaCInd − 0.50SBaCCh (15)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. Taking country moderator effects into account, we
have the full AGP pattern for all four samples: Ab> Ba and Ab>
aB [USA odds-ratios exp(−0.53 + 1.54) = 2.75 and exp(−0.53
+ 1.75) = 3.39, respectively; UK odds-ratios = exp(−0.53 +
1.54 + 0.52 + 0.73) = 9.58 and exp(−0.53 + 1.75 + 0.52 +
0.42) = 8.67, respectively; India odds-ratios exp(−0.53 + 1.54
+ 0.42 + 1.09) = 12.43 and exp(−0.53 + 1.75 + 0.42 + 0.63)
= 9.68, respectively, and China odds-ratios exp(−0.53 + 1.54
+ 0.38 + 0.50) = 6.62 and exp(−0.53 + 1.75 + 0.38 − 0.36)
= 3.46, respectively]; and bA > aB and bA > Ba [USA odds-
ratios exp (1.75) = 5.75 and exp (1.54) = 4.66, respectively; UK
odds-ratios exp(1.75+ 0.42)= 8.76 and exp (1.54+ 0.73)= 9.68,
respectively; India odds-ratios exp (1.75+ 0.63)= 10.80 and exp
(1.54 + 1.09) = 13.87, respectively; and China odds-ratios exp
(1.75− 0.36)= 4.01 and exp (1.54+ 0.50)= 7.69, respectively].
Study 3 S7: The more “Iraqi”(A) he is, the less “Own
Country”(B) he will be. As hypothesized, the histograms in
Appendix B in Supplementary Material suggest the AGP pattern.
The model for this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SBa − β3SaB − γ1CUK − γ2CInd
− γ3CCh − δ11SAbCUK − δ12SAbCInd − δ13SAbCCh
− δ21SBaCUK − δ22SBaCInd − δ23SBaCCh
− δ31SaBCUK − δ32SaBCInd − δ33SaBCCh
= αj + 0.08SAb − 0.71SBa − 0.83SaB + 1.44CUK
+ 0.44CInd + 1.01CCh − 0.17SAbCUK
+ 0.60SAbCInd − 0.42SAbCCh − 1.79SBaCUK
− 0.19SBaCInd − 0.20SBaCCh − 1.59SaBCUK
+ 0.70SaBCInd − 0.16SaBCCh (16)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. Taking country moderator effects into account,
we have the full AGP pattern for all four samples with one
exception in the Indian sample: Ab > Ba and Ab > aB [USA
odds-ratios exp(0.08+ 0.71)= 2.20 and exp(0.08+ 0.83)= 2.48,
respectively; UK odds-ratios exp(0.08 + 0.71 − 0.17 + 1.79) =
11.13 and exp(0.08 + 0.83 − 0.17 + 1.59) = 10.28, respectively;
India odds-ratios exp(0.08 + 0.71 + 0.60 + 0.19) = 4.85 and
exp(0.08 + 0.83 + 0.60 − 0.70) = 2.25, respectively, and China
odds-ratios exp(0.08 + 0.71 − 0.42 + 0.20) = 1.77 and exp(0.08
+ 0.83 − 0.42 + 0.16) = 1.92, respectively]; and bA > aB and
bA > Ba [USA odds-ratios exp(0.83) = 2.29 and exp(0.71) =
2.03, respectively; UK odds-ratios exp(0.83 + 1.59) = 11.25 and
exp(0.71+ 1.79)= 12.18, respectively; India odds-ratios exp(0.83
− 0.70) = 1.14, non-significant, and exp(0.71 + 0.19) = 2.46,
respectively; and China odds-ratios exp(0.83 + 0.16) = 2.69 and
exp(0.71+ 0.20)= 2.48, respectively].
Study 3 S8: The more “Iraqi”(A) he is, the less “German”(B)
he will be. As hypothesized, the histograms in Appendix B in
Supplementary Material suggest the AGP pattern. The model for
this item is
P
(
Yi ≤ j
)
= αj − β1SAb − β2SBa − β3SaB − γ1CUK − γ2CInd
− γ3CCh − δ11SAbCUK − δ12SAbCInd − δ13SAbCCh
− δ21SBaCUK − δ22SBaCInd − δ23SBaCCh
− δ31SaBCUK − δ32SaBCInd − δ33SaBCCh
= αj + 0.19SAb − 0.57SBa − 0.88SaB + 1.07CUK
+ 0.54CInd + 0.49CCh + 0.16SAbCUK
+ 0.43SAbCInd − 0.03SAbCCh − 1.44SBaCUK
− 0.36SBaCInd + 0.17SBaCCh − 1.08SaBCUK
− 0.02SaBCInd + 0.06SaBCCh (17)
For the item permutations, the reference category is the bA
combination. Taking country moderator effects into account, we
have the full AGP pattern for all four samples: Ab > Ba and Ab
> aB [USA odds-ratios exp(0.19 + 0.57) = 2.14 and exp(0.19 +
0.88) = 2.92, respectively; UK odds-ratios = exp(0.19 + 0.57 +
0.16+ 1.44)= 10.59 and exp(0.19+ 0.88+ 0.16+ 1.08)= 10.07,
respectively; India odds-ratios exp(0.19 + 0.57 + 0.43 + 0.36)
= 4.71 and exp(0.19 + 0.88 + 0.43 + 0.02) = 4.57, respectively,
and China odds-ratios exp(0.19 + 0.57 − 0.03 − 0.17) = 1.75
and exp(0.19 + 0.88 − 0.03 − 0.06) = 2.66, respectively]; and
bA > aB and bA > Ba [USA odds-ratios exp(0.88) = 2.41 and
exp(0.57) = 1.77, respectively; UK odds-ratios exp(0.88 + 1.08)
= 7.10 and exp(0.57 + 1.44) = 7.46, respectively; India odds-
ratios exp (0.88 + 0.02) = 2.46 and exp(0.57 + 0.36) = 2.53,
respectively; and China odds-ratios exp(0.88 − 0.06) = 2.27 and
exp(0.57− 0.17)= 1.49, respectively].
Study 3 Discussion
Study 3 replicated two additional findings from Study 1 and
extended them to the UK, India, and China. S2 and S3 exhibited
the patterns found for them in Study 1 (ACP and strict zero-
sum, respectively) in the samples from all four countries. Study
3 replicated the Study 2 findings in the American, British, and
Indian samples for S4, S5, and S6, and strengthened the claim for
an ACP pattern in S1 by identifying it in the Indian as well as
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the British and American samples. The Study 2 patterns in all of
these statements were found in the China sample with one minor
exception for S4.
Items S7 and S8, the statements involving migrants, exhibited
AGP patterns in all four samples, with a minor exception in
the Indian sample for S7. Notably, the AGP pattern occurred
in the China sample, despite the question not only being in
Chinese but also altered to refer to migration from one Chinese
province to another. Implications regarding this pair of items for
understanding when social identities are viewed as zero-sum are
elaborated in Smithson et al. (2015).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three studies, we have accumulated strong evidence that
zero-sum-like statements are endorsed unequally when their
elements are permuted, and these unequal endorsements exhibit
systematic patterns that hold for adult samples from two
Western and two non-Western cultures. In this section, we
first characterize these patterns in terms of sets of preferences
between pairs of alternative permutations of a zero-sum-like
statement. We then briefly address the question of how strong
these preferences are.
The patterns are listed in Table 9, with the differential
endorsements listed as preferences for each pattern. For example,
the ARF pattern includes the preferences Ab ≻ aB and Ba ≻ bA.
The ACP pattern in Table 9 accords stronger belief to the effect
of resource consumer A in the “if ” part of the “if-then” statement
than to the same effect of resource consumer B in the same
position. This may reflect a belief that increases (decreases) in
a resource to A drive their opposites in B to a greater extent
than increases (decreases) to B drives A. For instance, participant
data indicated beliefs that increases in immigration rates decrease
available jobs but not the converse; and increased time spent at
work decreases time spent in personal relationships but not the
converse.
The AGP pattern, on the other hand, seems to reflect a belief
that an increase in a resource to consumer A will decrease
the resource for consumer B, and vice-versa, whereas declining
fortunes for the rich will not necessarily benefit the poor. In
the two national-identity items with the immigrants, increased
identification with the country of origin is believed to decrease
assimilation to the adopted country and vice versa, but decreased
identification with the country of origin may not correlate
with assimilation. One possible distinction between propositions
yielding the AGP vs. the ACP pattern is that the AGP-yielding
propositions may include a belief that consumer A is more likely
than B to acquire more of the resource (e.g., the rich always will
TABLE 9 | Patterns of differential zero-sum statement endorsement.
ARF Ab ≻ aB Ba ≻ bA
ACP Ab ≻ Ba aB ≻ bA
AGP Ab ≻ aB Ab ≻ Ba bA ≻ aB bA ≻ Ba
Partial ARF + ACP Ab ≻ aB ≻ bA Ab ≻ Ba
Partial ARF + Partial ACP Ab ≻ bA aB ≻ bA Ba ≻ bA
get richer, or the immigrant always will identify more strongly
with the country of origin).
The ARF pattern in indicates a stronger endorsement of “if
more then less” than “if less then more.” We did not observe
a complete ARF pattern, but parts of it in connection with
the ACP pattern. For instance, increased immigration decreases
available jobs, whereas it is not as strongly believed that decreased
immigration will increase available jobs. Thus, as suggested
earlier, ARF patterns reflect beliefs about asymmetries in the
excludability of resources, whereas the ACP pattern indicates
beliefs about power differentials. The AGP pattern, on the other
hand, combines these two components into a belief that there is a
one-way flow of a resource to one consumer at the expense of the
other.
The sizes of these effects are substantial, and this can be
seen via the odds-ratio comparisons in Table 10. These are
exponentiated mean coefficients for relevant samples, rescaled
where necessary to use the bA pattern as the reference pattern.
For example, the ACP entry is from the statements about time
with friends vs. family, averaged over all four samples from Study
3. The Ab= 3.502 entry says that the odds of the Ab pattern being
endorsed in a higher category is 3.502 times greater than the odds
for bA, for any two-way split between the categories of the ordinal
scale. These odds-ratios also echo the patterns of endorsement
preferences for each corresponding pattern in Table 9.
Our findings have implications for the study of zero-
sum beliefs, regarding measurement, experimentation, and
theory development. Starting with measurement, it is clear
that permuting many zero-sum-like statements affects their
endorsement in systematic ways. It is striking that a strict
zero-sum endorsement pattern (treating the permutations as
equally valid) was seldom observed in the three studies, even for
statements where one could make a logical case that they are
“objectively” zero-sum (e.g., tradeoffs between hours of sunlight
and cloudiness). Moreover, the patterns of unequal endorsement
were demonstrated to be robust and stable, not only across
samples, but also between a 5- vs. 7-point response format. Nor
TABLE 10 | Odds-ratio summary effect sizes.
Pattern Odds-Ratio Summary Effect Sizes
FRIENDS-FAMILY (FOUR SAMPLES FROM STUDY 3)
ACP Ab = 3.502 bA = 1.000
aB = 3.656 Ba = 1.574
RICH-POOR (SEVEN SAMPLES FROM STUDIES 2 AND 3)
AGP Ab = 0.913 bA = 1.000
aB = 0.182 Ba = 0.132
WORK-PERSONAL (FOUR SAMPLES (USA AND UK)
FROM STUDIES 2 AND 3)
Partial ARF Ab = 5.878 bA = 1.000
+ACP aB = 3.375 Ba = 0.901
BEST FRIEND (SIX SAMPLES (EXCLUDING CHINA)
FROM STUDIES 2 AND 3)
Partial ARF Ab = 1.819 bA = 1.000
+Partial ACP aB = 1.799 Ba = 1.659
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is the list of such patterns likely to extend beyond the two that
we anticipated and the third that we encountered in Study 2, as
indicated by the fact that no additional patterns were revealed in
Study 3. Finally, these effects are substantial and not ignorable,
as indicated by the magnitudes of the odds-ratios reported in the
ordinal logistic regression analyses.
How, then, may we measure and study zero-sum beliefs and
the factors that influence them? Clearly the strength of belief
in a zero-sum-like proposition cannot generally be captured
entirely by ratings of one version of that statement. A prudent
course is to present all four permutations of a zero-sum-like
proposition and ascertain whether participants equally endorse
them or whether they appear to be using a heuristic that renders
them unequally believable, at least during the pilot-testing phase
of a study. Unequal endorsements may reflect participants’ beliefs
about the power relations between the consumers, or stock and
flow properties of the resources. It also should be noted that
we have not dealt with cases where resources X and Y are free
to be switched between consumers A and B. Such cases yield
8 possible permutations rather than just 4. They may arise in
some types of trade relations (e.g., where countries A and B
both may manipulate trade tariffs to influence each other’s trade
opportunities) and therefore are worthy of investigation.
Crucially, permutations of zero-sum-like statements may
moderate the relationships between zero-sum thinking and
individual differences measures of the kind investigated by
Smithson and Shou (2016), or between zero-sum thinking and
social psychological factors such as those reported in Smithson
et al. (2015). It remains to be seen whether the patterns of unequal
endorsement identified in our studies moderate the influence
of such factors on the propensity to have zero-sum beliefs,
although the Smithson and Shou (2016) work found no evidence
of moderator effects of this kind. Nevertheless, given the current
state of the art, measuring zero-sum beliefs necessarily involves
two components: Strengths and configuration of the beliefs.
An implication of a framing interpretation is that these
permutations may influence the extent to which people become
“locked in” to a zero-sum orientation. This implication also is
amenable to experimental tests. For example, Meegan’s (2010)
claim about people being more sensitive to others’ gains than
to others’ losses is relevant here, because it is part of the ARF
pattern. If members of group A are primed with the statement
“The more X for group B, the less X for group A,” than may
cause them to feel greater rivalry with group B than the statement
“The less X for group B, the more X for group B.” Moreover, this
effect may bemoderated by the extent to which group Amembers
believe groups A and B are in competition for resource X.
Finally, we return to the more general point in the
introduction to this paper, noting that our findings essentially
amount to a type of “order-effect” akin to, though distinct
from, certain kinds found in attitude and decision research.
One of the motivations behind this paper is to alert researchers
to the possibility that permutation order-effects may exist in
the measurement of other attitudes besides zero-sum beliefs.
It seems plausible, for instance, that such effects are likely
to be found in attitudinal statements that involve modus-
ponens or conditionals (if A then B), association (A occurs
with B), or causation (A causes B). In situations where
researchers consider that either ordering (A-B or B-A) could
be utilized for an item, it may be worthwhile to test for an
order-effect.
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